The analysis of electoral maps reveals the growth of the right in the country’s municipalities since 2016

In 2016, around 79% of municipalities were occupied by mayors belonging to right-wing, centre-right and far-right parties. Four years later, this percentage rose to 84% and, for now, this year it has reached 86%.

A look at Brazilian news in the first week after the first round of municipal elections suggests some hasty conclusions or a certain degree of imprecision. The first and perhaps most discussed was the “advance” of the right-wing camp across the country. This first reading has almost always been associated with speculation about the effects of the 2024 electoral maps on the 2026 presidential race. I would like to contribute to this debate by presenting some data and considerations.

Regarding the first point, the tone and emphasis given suggest that the right-wing camp has “finally” become a majority in Brazil. The “novelty”, in this case, would therefore indicate the challenges that this “new” reconfiguration of political forces would impose on political managers and on society as a whole. But we can say that there is nothing new in the dominance of right-wing parties at the helm of municipalities. Paradoxically there was an increase on the right, but it was much smaller than the impression one got from following the news.

In the analyzes of the situation that we conduct at the National Institute of Science and Technology (INCT), Representation and Democratic Legitimacy (Redem), a research group led by the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), the electoral maps, as we can see, show that right-wing parties already control the majority of municipalities since 2016 (the 2024 map only considers the results of the 1st round).

If the right field was already dominant, what would be new in 2024? It would have a gain of about two percentage points. In 2016, around 79% of municipalities were occupied by mayors belonging to right-wing, centre-right and far-right parties. Four years later, this percentage rose to 84% and this year, for now, it has reached 86%. There is, of course, an important statistical effect to note. If it were already strongly dominant, right field would, of course, have very little room to advance. It is worth mentioning that this percentage is expected to increase a little more, given that the right field still participates in the second round in different cities and with real chances of winning.

A novelty, however, that is worth highlighting is the more pronounced blue color on the 2024 map, which represents the municipalities won by the far right, in particular by the PL. In 2020 they practically did not exist, but this year it is possible to notice some municipalities that will be administered by this ideological subgroup. The left camp, in turn, expands the spaces especially in the Northeast, in the territorially smaller municipalities.

Since the maps hide the size of the municipalities, i.e. the size of the electorate, depending on the municipalities administered by the left or the right, we make a second consideration, now considering the weight of the cities. As expected, the conclusion also goes in the same direction. The right-wing camp was already in the majority and further expanded its dominance over a sizable contingent of voters. To save space, I present here only the graphs relating to 2020 and 2024.

According to the 2020 chart, the right-wing camp ran the cities with the largest number of voters. No less than 85% of the electorate had a right-wing mayor at the helm of the municipality. The left camp administered cities that represented just over 14% of the electorate. Note that the left was present in almost all voters and city areas. What happened in 2024?

In 2024, the right will increase the number of small cities, apparently in a move towards greater internalization. Despite this, it dominates in the range between 500 thousand and 1 million voters and even above 2 million (always without a 2nd round). The left has been flattened in small and medium-sized cities. Now the contingent dominated by the right field has reached 88%.

But what does all this allow us to say about 2026?

This question is fundamental, without a doubt, but its ability to answer it has limits. The first is that the maps present only the ideological classifications of the elected mayors’ parties. From them it is not possible to deduce that the voters voted for ideological reasons. In Brazil, it is worth mentioning, party identification is low. Even though we are in a more ideological phase of Brazilian political history and, in fact, some voters may have decided based on the ideological variable in some municipalities, its explanatory capacity overall, I believe, is still low.

A quick test. If in 2020 the municipalities and electoral contingent were already largely administered by right-wing parties, why did Brazil elect a left-wing president in 2022? This problem, therefore, leads us to be a little more parsimonious in our inferences about 2026. In addition to the low party identification in Brazil, which does not mean that voters do not have an ideology, local reasons weigh heavily in the process of choosing the population. therefore the limitations to 2026.

A point I would like to draw attention to. Most of the town halls won by the right-wing camp were won by centre-right parties, which have greater political flexibility. Some analysts prefer to call them physiological parties, whose actions are driven by tangible and immediate gains, both in association with the right and the left.

In other words, this group of center parties will be able to support a presidential candidate from the right as well as the left camp. It will depend a lot on the situation in 2026, especially on the names that will appear in the disputes and on the expectations of power that each will be able to convey.

Then there is a third point, this one of great relevance with regards to 2026 and which is connected to the previous consideration. The 2024 map clearly demonstrates the political strength of local machines and their respective “owners”. From this perspective, what the 2024 maps indicate is who the 2026 candidates will have to negotiate with, if they want local support from electoral machines with capillarity and political strength capable of making a difference at the polls.

Note: The ideological classification of parties that I used in this analysis is based on the updated database version of the study “A new ideological classification of Brazilian parties”, by Bruno Bolognesi, Ednaldo Ribeiro and Adriano Codato, published in 2023 by Revista dados.

Fábio Vasconcellos does not consult, work for, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that could benefit from the publication of this article, and has not disclosed any relevant connections beyond his academic position.

Source: Terra

Rose

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